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Abstract
Ebola is a severe, acute viral disease, characterized by the sudden onset of fever, vomit-
ing, and profuse diarrhoea, leading to severe dehydration, haemorrhagic diathesis, sig-
niﬁ cant blood loss, shock, often with a fatal outcome. The disease is transmitted by ei-
ther direct contact with blood or other bodily ﬂ uids of live or deceased infected people. 
Transmission may also occur by unprotected sexual contact or by direct contact with the 
blood or body ﬂ uids of animals. Before 2013, the maximum number of infected people 
in a single outbreak of Ebola was 425. This ﬁ gure was signiﬁ cantly exceeded during the 
largest wave of Ebola that began in December 2013 in West Africa. The epidemiologi-
cal situation is being closely monitored by the states of the European Union. The World 
Health Organization has issued recommendations for travellers to countries aﬀ ected by 
the Ebola virus.
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Introduction 
Ebola is a very severe, acute viral disease characterized by the sudden onset of 
symptoms such as fever, vomiting, profuse and diarrhoea, which leads to severe 
dehydration, haemorrhagic diathesis, signiﬁ cant blood loss, shock, and often re-
sults in a fatal outcome.
History and incidence 
The ﬁ rst acknowledged incidence dates back to 1972, when a particular doctor 
(Tom Cairns) contracted the disease by being exposed to an eviscerated corpse, 
but only thereafter did this become publicly recognized.
The ﬁ rst contemporary presence of the disease was publicly acknowledged 
in 1976, when an outbreak of epidemic haemorrhagic fever emerged in southern 
Sudan and northern Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of Congo). In southern 
Sudan—speciﬁ cally near the settlements of Nzara, Maridi, and Juba—151 people 
were infected with the Sudan Ebola virus strain; 53% were fatal. In Zaire, speciﬁ -
cally in the area of  the river Ebola, 280 people were infected by the Zaire strain 
of the Ebola virus, where fatality was 88%. The Ebola virus took its name from 
the River Ebola.
The occurrence of the Ebola virus has been rare in subsequent years. By 
2013, the maximum number of infected people in a single Ebola outbreak had 
reached 425 persons (in 2000–2001). This number was exceeded signiﬁ cantly in 
December 2013 in western Africa, where the most severe outbreak of Ebola ever 
was recorded. This concerned the Zaire Ebola virus strain. The ﬁ rst occurrence 
of the virus took place in December 2013 in southern Guinea (the WHO state-
ment was not made until March 2014). From this area, the disease spread to the 
two neighbouring countries Liberia and Sierra Leone, and consequently spread 
through travel to several other states.
By October 12, 2014, the total number of reported infected people had 
reached 8,997 (out of which 5,006 of the infected were laboratory conﬁ rmed). 
Out of these 8,997 cases, 4,493 people died (50% death rate) [1,2,3].
Etiology
The causative agent is highly pathogenic non-enveloped RNA Ebolavirus of the 
Filoviridae genus. Serologically distinct strains were isolated and named accord-
ing to the place of occurrence. We are currently familiar with ﬁ ve kinds of virus 
of the Ebolavirus genus, in the following order: Zaire Ebolavirus, Sudan Ebolavi-
rus, Tai Forest Ebolavirus, Bundibugyo Ebolavirus, and Reston Ebolavirus.
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The ﬁ rst four types have African origin and are the cause of disease in 
humans and animals. Reston originates from the Philippines and is the cause of 
disease only in animals. The pathogenicity of the various subtypes to humans is 
diverse: the most severe mortality has been reported in the Zaire subtype of Eb-
olavirus that caused a major epidemic in 2014.
Ebola virus is about 80 nm in diameter with a standard length of 970 nm. 
The virus has a length ratio of about 1:12 and the form can be either twisted or 
bent. This virus is morphologically indistinguishable from the Marburg virus; 
however, immunologically it is completely diﬀ erent. The Ebola virus can be reli-
ably deactivated with ultraviolet light, gamma irradiation, 1% formalin, P-propi-
olactone, hypochlorite, and at a temperature of 60°C for 30 minutes. Ebola can 
also be eﬀ ectively destroyed by soap, bleach, sunlight, or drying, therefore laun-
dering in a washing machine is eﬀ ective. When placed on a surface, or a surface 
exposed to direct sunlight, the virus can only survive for a short period.
Epidemiology
Susceptibility to Ebola fever disease is generalized. It is assumed that there is 
a reservoir in animals. Bats appear to be the most probable animal reservoir, be-
cause only they are able to replicate the virus without contracting severe disease. 
Reservoir animals may also be living or deceased wild animals such as monkeys 
and forest antelopes.
Transmission from human to human has yet been clearly demonstrated, 
only perhaps by direct bodily contact with infected (also deceased) people or 
animals, or through blood contact and other bodily ﬂ uids. [4] Transmission may 
occur through unprotected sexual contact with recovered patients, even when 
several weeks have passed since recovery.
The main reason for the unrecognized rapid spread of Ebola fever in hos-
pitals is human-to-human transmission in the early days of the epidemic stages, 
with health professionals aﬀ ected the most, in particular those who do not use 
barrier protection due to ignorance or unconﬁ rmed diagnosis. [5]
Transmission of infection is also possible by objects infected by bodily ﬂ u-
ids (materials, needles, etc.), as the virus most likely survives outside the body on 
objects for several days. However, the virus is deactivated after a few days when 
exposed to dry surfaces in direct sunlight. [6]
The virus is able to survive on objects, especially at low temperatures (e.g., 
in one study at 4°C for more than 50 days on a glass object) and at room tempera-
ture. According to some studies, the virus seems to have survived on objects only 
for a few hours or not at all. [7] Aerogenic transmission only occurs in the Reston 
sub-types, whereas in others it is very rare. The WHO currently states that trans-
mission of the disease by air has not yet been proven. [8]However, according to 
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Smith 2006, in some cases, disease transmission could possibly be air born, par-
ticularly in the Reston Ebolavirus strain. The study suggests that Zaire Ebolavirus 
has been transmitted in some cases without direct contact with an infected person. 
In 1995, isolation of Ebolavirus took place from lung tissue. [8] A diﬀ erent kind 
of test on monkeys proved that the virus could also be transmitted by directly 
breathing via water droplets via air onto monkeys [7]. In another test, Zaire Eb-
olavirus was transferred from pigs to monkeys without direct contact, although, 
paradoxically, the virus was not transmitted from monkey to monkey under the 
same conditions. [9] It is assumed (at least for the Sudan and Zaire Ebolavirus), 
that the virus gets transmitted speciﬁ cally through mucous membranes and con-
junctivas, throat surfaces, the digestive tract, through small skin abrasions, and 
possibly by aerosols. [9]
Incubation time most commonly lasts for 14–16 days, but may range from 
2–21 days. The pathogenesis is not very clear. The virus attacks diﬀ erent tis-
sues, including lymphoid and endothelial cells. This process involves extensive 
production of cytokines, development of SIRS and multiple organ dysfunction. 
Dysfunction of the vascular endothelium promotes the formation of DIC and 
necrosis of the liver and other organs. Persistent viremia continues for the entire 
acute phase of the disease, and with a favourable course of treatment the disease 
disappears and clinical recovery is achieved.
Clinical manifestation
Typical onset of the disease begins with sudden fatigue, malaise, fever, chest pain, 
general pain, nausea, vomiting and diarrhoea. Macula-papulosis rash, pharyngitis 
with painful ulceration, dry cough, myalgia and arthritis begin to appear around 
the ﬁ fth day. Profuse diarrhoea and vomiting lead to signiﬁ cant dehydration. In 
about 70% of cases, bleeding gums, and nasal and vaginal bleeding appear on 
the seventh day. Internal haemorrhage (typically of the gastrointestinal tract) and 
haemorrhagic skin lesions appear very often. Jaundice occurs in only about 5% 
of cases. Patients die in the second week of the disease due to substantial blood 
loss, dehydration and shock. [10]
Diagnostics
In terms of recognition of the disease, emphasis is placed on travel history in af-
fected areas.
Signiﬁ cant thrombocytopenia, leukopenia, and a signiﬁ cant increase in 
transaminases can be sought in laboratory examinations.
In the serological diagnosis, a widely used indirect immunoﬂ uorescence 
test often leads to false positive results. Signiﬁ cantly, the ELISA test or standard-
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ized “Western blot essay” is more accurate. Seroconversion occurs between the 
8th and 12th day of illness. IgM antibodies can be detected by the ELISA test in 
the period near to recovery.
Viral cultivation of blood and other biological materials is possible during 
the febrile stage. For the purposes of isolating and cultivating the virus, primary 
isolation on guinea pigs may be used on a number of cell lines (Vero, clone E-6, 
E 13, the MA-104 Reston sub-type).
In suspected cases or early laboratory diagnosis of Ebola virus, the detection 
of viral ribonucleic acid (RNA) or viral antigen is recommended. Tests are based on 
the identiﬁ cation of viral RNA by real-time polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) 
PCR using the reverse transcriptase assay or detection of speciﬁ c antigen of Ebola 
virus. Negative laboratory testing for the presence of Ebola virus requires two nega-
tive results of RT-PCR from a specimen, taken at least 48 hours apart. Laboratory 
diagnosis can only be performed in maximum safety laboratories.
Therapy
There is only symptomatic treatment for the disease: no speciﬁ c treatment is 
available. Administration of interferon is ineﬀ ective and usually results in fever 
and other symptoms that only complicate the underlying condition. Positive re-
sults have been shown in transfusion of blood from patients with recent illness. 
The monitoring of blood clotting and maintaining ﬂ uid and electrolyte balance 
appears to be very important.
Prevention and prophylaxis
Unfortunately, there is no vaccine against the disease. Even though a DNA vac-
cine is currently under development, the results are currently not very promising.
The risk of contracting Ebola infection is low when travelling to aﬀ ected 
areas (Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone and Nigeria), unless directly exposed 
to bodily ﬂ uids of infected live or deceased people and animals. The disease is 
not transmitted through casual contact in public with people who do not exhibit 
signs of the disease. Ebola virus is not transmitted by handling money or food, or 
swimming in pools. Transmission by mosquitoes has been detected.
Health measures
Disease or suspected Ebola fever should be reported immediately. [11]
The health of persons who have returned from aﬀ ected areas should be 
monitored for at least 21 days after leaving the aﬀ ected area. This reﬂ ects the 
maximum incubation period of the Ebola Virus (2–21 days).
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Travellers returning from aﬀ ected areas should stay at home and contact 
their family doctor if experiencing symptoms such as body temperature ≥ 38.6°C, 
headache, vomiting, diarrhoea, abdominal pain, or unexplained bleeding. The 
doctor should be informed about the clinical condition and travel anamnesis of 
the aﬀ ected person.
Transport of patients suspected of carrying the disease is carried out by 
Coordination centres of the Emergency Medical Services (EMS KOS) in Brati-
slava, Banska Bystrica and Kosice (in the headquarters designated for infectious 
workplaces). Paramedic staﬀ  will then place the person suspected of carrying the 
disease into a Biovak transport, and surface disinfection of staﬀ  members and the 
Biovak vehicle takes place. Subsequently, the Biovak containing the suspected 
case and other involved individuals are transported to the relevant department of 
infectious diseases at the local hospital.
During the transportation period, the patient is looked after by two persons 
equipped with protective devices.
The patient and caregivers are immediately placed into isolation for a pe-
riod of 3 weeks in a separate part of the isolation ward. If the infectiology unit de-
cides to collect biological material for laboratory testing for Ebola, the National 
Reference Centre for Haemorrhagic Fevers is informed, and biological material 
is collected.
The Public Health Oﬃ  ce of the Slovak Republic (PHO SR) provides 
transport of clinical specimens via certiﬁ ed services to an accredited laboratory 
in Hamburg (Germany). The Public Health Authority ensures reporting of con-
ﬁ rmed cases to the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) 
and the World Health Organization (WHO).
The patient is isolated for a period of 5 days after the last measured el-
evated temperature. Specimen collection should be carried out in a mask, coat, 
apron, cap, goggles, face shield, rubber gloves, and boots. Infectious material is 
then dispatched by a special security team. Sample examination is carried out at 
a limited number of laboratories that co-operate with the World Health Organisa-
tion and are equipped with maximum-security facilities. 
The World Health Organisation
Due to the fact that since December 2013 attempts aimed at trying to stop the epi-
demic of Ebola have failed, the World Health Organization (WHO) has declared 
a state of emergency for the aﬀ ected areas, eﬀ ective August 08, 2014. The state 
of emergency for the aﬀ ected areas allows WHO to issue recommendations in 
order to take additional precaution measures. In this particular matter, all aﬀ ected 
countries were invited by WHO to declare a state of emergency and adopt the 
strictest health measures ever.
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Action of European Commission
Ebola epidemics have become an issue for the European Commission (EC) to 
deal with through the Health and Safety Committee (HSC) in collaboration with 
the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC). EK communi-
cates with all Member States and seeks to determine the readiness of all member 
states. ECDC has issued traveller guidelines that have been translated into the 
languages of all member states. The Public Health Authority guidelines in Slovak 
language were placed on its website immediately. The EC document is currently 
under discussion and will soon be available to all State Members for publication.
Measures in the Slovak Republic
Slovakia has taken measures of the Public Health Authority of the Slovak Repub-
lic (PHA), the Ministry of Foreign Aﬀ airs of the Slovak Republic (MFA), and 
the Ministry of Transport, Construction and Regional Development (MDVaRR)
MFA to issue series of guidelines and recommendations on its website for 
the inhabitants of the Slovak Republic aimed at reconsideration of travel arrange-
ments to aﬀ ected areas. However, those who decide to travel have the opportunity 
to register electronically in the MFA database.
MDVaRR has secured an insulated box at MR Stefanik Airport in Brati-
slava for contacting emergency services and distributing recommendations for 
travellers at the airport.
There is a medical establishment available in Slovakia that is suitable for 
the purposes of receiving, monitoring and patient treatment of those who have 
tested positive for Ebola viral disease. This is the Infectiology and Geographical 
Medicine Clinic in Bratislava, the only establishment in the Slovak Republic with 
beds that meet the 4th level BSL bio-security standard.
Due to haemorrhagic fevers, the National Reference Centre (NRC) does 
not have the methodology to diagnose Ebola virus, nor does it have bio-safety 
level BSL 4; therefore, it is necessary to conduct laboratory diagnostics abroad 
(accredited laboratory: Robert Koch Institute, Germany).
The Public Health Oﬃ  ce of the Slovak Republic (PHO SR) is in constant 
contact with competent European authorities. The Public Health Authority regu-
larly receives updates from the ECDC about the current epidemiological situ-
ation, which it publishes on its website and supplies to media bodies, with the 
objective being to provide objective information to the public. The Public Health 
Authority asked the head hygienist MDVaRR for synergy, in case of travellers 
carrying suspected Ebola viral disease by air to the Slovak Republic.
Although the risk of introducing Ebola epidemics in Slovakia is low, the 
Public Health Authority recommends the following procedure:
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• When travellers return from aﬀ ected areas with clinical symptoms such as 
fever, unexplained fatigue, diarrhoea, sore throat, cough, or other severe 
symptoms, staying at home is advisable, followed by an immediate call to 
a physician and submitting travel history;
• Those returning from aﬀ ected areas should monitor their clinical condition 
for a minimum of 21 days after arrival (disease incubation period is 2–21 
days);
• The medical care facility team that accepts a person under suspicion of 
being infected should use protective equipment (in accordance with the 
approved operating rules);
• Physicians should evaluate the patient’s clinical status, providing samples 
if it proves necessary for laboratory examinations;
• In accordance with Annex 5 of Act 355/2007 Coll. on protection, support 
and development of public health haemorrhagic fevers in group A, disease 
and suspected disease should be reported immediately (by telephone, fax, 
electronically, messenger, in person) and sent to the competent regional 
public health authority;
• Referential infectious disease clinics or isolation wards are recommended 
to consult with the Department of Infectiology and Geographical Medicine 
in Bratislava;
• The competent regional oﬃ  ce should provide a complete epidemiological 
investigation of the case, take relevant anti-epidemic measures, and report 
the result to the Public Health Authority;
• Epidemic measures are issued by the competent Regional Public Health 
Authority and the Public Health Authority in accordance with the Act 
355/2007 Coll. on protection, support and development of public health;
• In public health emergencies of the second degree, where special regula-
tions should be put in place, the Public Health Authority or the regional 
public health oﬃ  ce submits a proposal to authorities competent in the ﬁ eld 
of civil protection for declaration of an emergency;
• In accordance with the International Health Regulations of the Public 
Health Authority, these cases are reported to the WHO and via a prompt 
alert system to ECDC and the European Commission.
Conclusions
The risk of Ebola infection spreading in European countries and the Slovak Re-
public is small. The World Health Organization and the Public Health Authority 
of the Slovak Republic constantly monitors the Ebola situation. The public is 
informed through the website. Measures are adopted according to the progression 
of the epidemiological situation.
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